SIL in Plain English: How to Think About SIL2 for Gas & Flame Systems

Frequency Severity of Consequence
1 2 3 4 5
5 SIL3 SIL4 X X X
4 SIL2 SIL3 SIL4 X X
3 SIL1 SIL2 SIL3 SIL4 X
2 - SIL1 SIL2 SIL3 SIL4
1 - - SIL1 SIL2 SIL3

Hook (why this matters now):

Across CGD, CNG, and process facilities, “SIL2” gets thrown around in specs and audits—often as a device label. In reality, SIL is a system property of a Safety Instrumented Function (SIF)—not of a single detector. This newsletter strips the jargon down so you can design, justify, and maintain SIFs that actually achieve the integrity you promised.

The quick map

  • SIS (Safety Instrumented System): Sensors → Logic Solver → Final Elements.
  • SIF (Safety Instrumented Function): One protective action (e.g., “If CH₄ > X% LEL, trip ESD within 3 s”).
  • SIL: Target risk reduction level achieved by the whole SIF over its life.
  • Low-demand mode: Typical for gas/flame SIFs; we use PFDavg (average probability of failure on demand).
  • High/continuous demand: Uses PFH (probability of dangerous failure per hour).

What SIL2 actually means (low-demand)

For low-demand SIFs, target PFDavg ranges are:

  • SIL1: 1e-2 to <1e-1
  • SIL2: 1e-3 to <1e-2
  • SIL3: 1e-4 to <1e-3

To live inside the SIL2 band, you balance:

  • Architecture/voting: 1oo1 vs 1oo2 vs 2oo3. Voting can slash PFDavg but adds cost/complexity.
  • Diagnostics (DC): Built-in self-tests catch dangerous failures early.
  • Proof-test coverage (PTC) & interval (TI): Better coverage and more frequent tests reduce PFDavg.
  • Common cause (β): Redundancy only helps if common-cause failures are controlled.

Why a “SIL2 detector” isn’t enough

Devices can be SIL-capable (assessed via FMEDA), but only a complete, verified SIF can claim SIL2. You still need suitable logic solver, final elements, power, bypass policy, proof testing, and documentation to hit the target PFDavg.

IEC CIL2 Capable

A simple mental model (low-demand)

For a 1oo1 SIF, a teaching-level approximation is:

PFDavg ≈ λᵈᵘ_eff × TI / 2,
where λᵈᵘ_eff = λᵈᵘ × (1 − DC) × (1 − PTC)

For 1oo2 (two sensors, one vote out of two), a common simplified form is:

PFDavg ≈ β·(λᵈᵘ_eff·TI/2) + (1−β)·(λᵈᵘ_eff·TI/2)²

These aren’t certification-grade, but they help you see levers: diagnostics, test coverage, voting, and test intervals.

Practical path to SIL2 (field-proven checklist)

  1. Write an SRS for each SIF (trip points, response time, demand rate, proof-test method).
  2. Pick SIL-capable components (sensors, logic solver, final elements) with data for λᵈᵘ, DC, PTC.
  3. Choose architecture (1oo1 vs 1oo2) and estimate β; control common causes (separate power, routing, environment).
  4. Define proof tests (who/what/how often) and target TI based on your PFDavg goals.
  5. Plan bypass/override policy and logging; limit exposure time.
  6. Validate before commissioning; then maintain records (calibration, proof tests, failures, repairs).
  7. Recalculate PFDavg after significant changes (MoC).

Common Pitfalls (and fixes)

  • “We bought SIL2 detectors, so we’re SIL2.” → Tie devices into a verified SIF with a logic solver and final elements; document the achieved PFDavg.
  • Neglecting final elements. → Valves/ESD devices often dominate risk; include them in the proof test.
  • Over-optimistic test coverage. → If in doubt, assume lower PTC and add a targeted on-bench test step.
  • No response-time view. → Ensure trip + logic + valve times meet the SRS (e.g., <3 s for methane where required).
  • Poor MoC. → Even minor set-point tweaks can invalidate your SIL claim—log and re-verify.
PFD AVG CALCULATOR DOWNLOAD

Frequently asked questions

Sometimes—if TI is short, diagnostics are strong, and final elements are reliable; 1oo2 gives margin.

Only as SIL-capable. The SIF (system) achieves SIL.

Treat as low-demand; watch sensor placement and PTC for fine-leak scenarios.

Indirectly—better diagnostics and faster maintenance can lower effective PFDavg.